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Abstract:
In this paper I will explore the ramification of the distinction between fact and values in order to 
show that  human values  enter  in  various  ways in  both science and (nano)technologies  without 
violating Hume’s fact/value distinction. Among the nanotechnologies, I will discuss the case study 
provided  by  the  use  of  microchips  implanted  under  our  skin:  though  they  do  not  obviously 
overcome the limits of the natural laws (intended in the descriptive sense), their application might 
in principle jeopardize our ethical principles in a way that is more powerful than previously existing 
“macrotechnology”. This greater power depends on the fact that the properties of the macroworld 
depend on the “nanoworld”, but not conversely. 
Riassunto:
In  questo  saggio  esplorerò  le  ramificazioni  della  distinzione  tra  fatti  e  valori  allo  scopo  di 
mostrare che i valori umani entrano in vari modi sia nella scienza che nelle nanotecnologie senza 
violare la distinzione humeana tra fatti  e valori.  Tra le nanotecnologia,  discuterò il caso fornito 
dall’uso di microchips impiantati sotto la nostra pelle: malgrado essi non violino i limiti delle leggi 
naturali (intesi nel senso descrittivo del termine), la loro applicazione potrebbe in linea di principio 
mettere in pericolo i nostri principli etici in modo più pericolo della “macrotecnologia” esistente in 
precedenza. Questo maggiore potere dipende dal fatto che le proprietà del macromondo dipendono 
da quelle del micromondo, ma non viceversa.
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§1 Introduction
The philosophical reflection on the nature of technology in its relationship with science and ethics is an 
underdeveloped chapter in current analytic-oriented philosophy of science. Despite a growing interest in the 
role of technology for the advancement of science, especially for what concerns the constructions of models, 
the  use of simulations and the numerical  calculations provided by powerful  computers,  philosophers  of  
science seem to be more attracted by so-called “fundamental science” rather than by applied science and  
technology. And yet we are aware from historical studies on science that the role of technology has been  
essential both for the first scientific revolution (Rossi 1962) and for the so called “second”, a process that,  
according to Bellone (1973), took place during the later 19 th century. The science of thermodynamics, to 
name but one example, is a classical case in which attempts at understanding the efficiency of the steam  
engine has preceded and made possible the formulation of phenomenological and then theoretical laws. 
Here, however, I am not interested in the vexed problem whether pure science precedes or is preceded by 
applied, technologically oriented science, because I believe that the distinction between pure and applied 
science is  at  best  one  of  degree,  and  is  as  weak and vague  as  that  existing between pure  and applied  
mathematics. As is well known, the branches of mathematics that are regarded as pure do not remain “pure” 
for long, and are often those that suddenly display more “applicative power”: the examples of group theory 
for physics, of logic for computer science, or number theory for cryptography, are sufficient to illustrate this 
point. On the other hand, it is from branches of applied mathematics or mathematical physics that has often 
come the suggestion for the solutions of problems of pure mathematics, and the role of physics in the growth 
of mathematics hardly needs any illustration (think of Newton’s invention of the calculus, or Dirac’s delta 
function and the theory of distribution). 
Since the same relationship, I hold, is valid for pure science and applied science or technology, in this  
paper I will not discuss the problem of the heuristic primacy of pure science over technology or conversely. I 
think it is time for philosophers to draw their attention elsewhere, and try to inquire, the changing image of  
our place in nature that the development of science and technology has fostered in the last 500 hundred 
years.  I  think that  this  change has not  entered our common knowledge yet,  and has not  penetrated our  
emotional outlook toward nature. 
In order to understand more clearly what I am referring to, it is sufficient to concentrate our attention  
toward one single example, namely the transformation undergone by the very concept of “law” from a purely  
prescriptive to  a prescriptive and descriptive sense. Today we talk about  laws to refer both to the laws of 
physics in a purely descriptive sense, and to the norms regulating our social life. However in the ancient 
world, and among the Greeks in particular, the word nomos (“law”) was restricted only to the behaviour of 
human beings, and therefore had a pure prescriptive sense. This splitting of the meaning of the word “law” 
reflects very well  that  separation of facts from values which is  characteristic of  the creation of modern  
science, with its abandonment of the Aristotelian concept of a final cause, and which will be the object of 
analysis of the first part of my talk. Why is it that a word like law, that previously had a purely prescriptive  
meaning apt to capture the behaviour of persons, could eventually refer  also the workings of  inanimate 
matter? As I have shown elsewhere (Dorato 2005), the role of theology and technology in this transformation  
can hardly be exaggerated.
It  is  not  just  the  word law that  has  a tricky meaning,  the  word “nature” or “natural” has  obviously  
undergone the same fate: in philosophical discussions, the word “natural law” stands both for those ordered  
but unanimated types of phenomena that are subjects to physical laws (a purely descriptive meaning that  
refers to whatever is regular and repeatable: the laws of gravitation or the laws of optics, for instance) and to  
“laws” or “principles” pertaining to our moral nature, in particular within the so-called natural-law tradition,  
which is not restricted to theistic, or tomistic philosophies.
The natural-law tradition dates back at least to the ancient stoicism, and its main idea is that human 
beings are thought of enjoying some  natural rights, independently of social contracts of sorts, or of their  
belonging to a political or social community. Since political institutions in this tradition exists in order to 
3protect these natural rights, the existence of a natural-law was essential to prevent absolutist monarchies to  
invade what we call today the sphere of individual rights. Such rights, adherents to this philosophy claim, 
belong to a person “by nature”, “in virtue of our nature”, or of what “we are essentially”. 
This splitting in the meaning of words like “natural law” obviously create the problem of their conceptual 
relationship.  For instance,  how can we derive norms-prescriptions (how things ought to be) from facts-
descriptions (how things are) without violating the so-called Hume’s law, namely the thesis that we cannot 
deduce a moral imperative starting with “ought” from a statement of a fact, expressed with an “is”? Another,  
possibly  simpler  way  of  putting  Hume’s  law  is  that  ethical  judgments  do  not  state  facts,  but  express 
sentiments, passions, volitions, and often have the purpose of inducing our interlocutor to act or judge in a 
certain way. To what extent is this law valid? Do we have a dichotomy or simply a fact/value distinction? 
(Putnam, 2004)
In the first  part  of  this  paper,  I  will  try to clear the ground from frequent  misconceptions about  the  
relationship between fact and value by examining some rhetorical uses of the adjective “natural” in ethical  
controversies: this will serve us as an introduction to what in the title I called “the natural ambiguity of the 
word natural”. I will then use the historical case of the emergence of the notion of natural law to explain why 
the ambiguity of natural is “natural”, that is why many human cultures tend to regard nature (considered in a  
descriptive sense, as the complex of physical and biological phenomena) as the origin and source of moral  
end ethical norms. This preliminary, philosophical and conceptual clarification will be essential in the second 
part of the paper, where we will try to present the ethical web of problems generated by the application of  
some nano-technologies. I will primarily discuss some of the most interesting moral questions generated by 
mini-chips implantable under our skin. 
§2 The ambiguity of the word “natural”: a discussion of some paradigmatic examples
1) “It is natural for big fishes to eat small ones”, the slogan of the social Darwinists,
2) “this action, this law, this rule is against nature”, a frequently used rhetorical appeal
3)  “this  is  natural  (non-adulterated)  water,  this  is  natural,  “biological”  food”,  slogan  used  by 
environmentalists
4) “mammals are naturally carnivorous, or naturally polygamous”, 
5)  “the  (Italian)  Republic  acknowledges  the  rights  of  the  family  as  a  natural society  founded  on 
marriage”1. 
6) «Our individual natures are part of universal nature. Hence the chief good is life according to nature, 
that is, according to one's own and to universal nature». [Zeno of Cittium, Diogenes Laertium]. 
Let me briefly comments on each of these uses of “natural” in the list. All of them, and others that can be  
easily  found  by  analysing  common discourse,  can  all  be  classified  under  the  opposite perspectives  of 
behaviour, action, laws, etc. that are “according to nature” or are “against nature”.
1)  The first  metaphor was often presupposed by the ancient  sophists,  who introduced a fundamental 
distinction between what  is  “by nature” (physis)  and what  holds by “human convention” (nomos).  This 
distinction is often neglected in our discussion even today and is therefore worth recalling it. We should  
notice that  what holds “by nature” for the sophists concerns more or less stable regularities of the natural,  
biological world − like “the law of the strongest.” In the Platonic dialogue Gorgias, for instance, Callicles 
contrasts such regularities with the conventions of human laws, which were created by the weak to protect  
himself against the strong.  In a word, according to Callicles that there is a conflict between nature and laws,  
and human laws are criticized because they are “against nature”:
«But in my opinion those who framed the laws are the weaker folk, the majority. And accordingly they 
frame the laws for themselves and their own advantage, and so too with their approval and censure, and to 
prevent the stronger who are able to overreach them from gaining the advantage over them, they frighten 
them by saying that to overreach others is shameful and evil, and injustice consists in seeking the advantage 
over others. For they are satisfied, I suppose, if being inferior they enjoy equality of status. That is the reason 
why seeking an advantage over the many is by convention said to be wrong and shameful, and they call it  
injustice. But in my view nature herself makes it plain that it is right for the better to have the advantage over  
the worse, the more able over the less. And both among all animals and in entire states and races of mankind 
1  «La  Repubblica  riconosce  i  diritti  della  famiglia  come  società  naturale  fondata  sul  matrimonio  »(art.  29  of  the  Italian 
Constitution). 
4it is plain that this is the case--that right is recognized to be the sovereignty and advantage of the stronger 
over the weaker» (Plato, Gorgias 482e) 
It is quite clear that we do not accept Callicles’ argument as valid: unlike social Darwinists,  we do not 
consider the fact that big fishes eat smaller ones, and similar “natural” facts, as a justification for the validity 
of an ethical or a legal principle that would recognize to stronger or more intelligent people more rights than  
to weaker or less able persons. Possibly the Christian precept of helping the weak and the vulnerable is not  
going  against  nature,  but  it  certainly  amounts  to  an  reversal  of  what  is  a  widespread  regularity  of  the  
biological world. So human laws, to the extent that they protect the weak and limit the strong, are “against  
nature”, but this is no reason to criticize them from the moral point of view. This brief remark taken from the 
history of philosophy is a strong piece of evidence that ethical arguments drawn from “nature”, i.e., from 
widespread  regularities,  are  unsound.  Unlike  Callicles,  we  prefer  our  ethical,  possibly  conventional  
convictions to what  happens in nature, and refuse to model  our institutions on the relationship between  
predator and prey. Of course, in the natural, and in the human world, there are cooperative or “symptathetic”  
tendencies”,2 but they coexist with predatory and aggressive passions. In a word, it is our prior commitment 
to certain values (cooperation, selfishness) rather than others that make us select those biological regularities  
that best fit them in order to try to find a justification for those values.
2) Despite this, in public discussions scientists are sometime invited not to overcome the limits of nature,  
or not to go against it. Likewise, politicians and legislators are reminded not to vote for laws that would go  
against nature, or “human nature”. But what does “against nature”, “going beyond nature”, or overcoming 
the limits  of  nature,  mean? Properly speaking,  there  are  two ways of  interpreting the locution “against  
nature” or beyond nature, corresponding to a descriptive and a prescriptive sense of “nature”. 
In a descriptive sense, events going “against nature”, or that “overcome its limits”, would be events that  
occurs highly infrequently,  very rarely,  or  even “miracles”.  These,  however,  would not  count  as events 
breaking  the  laws  of  nature,  if  by  laws  we  mean  exception-less,  universal  regularities  described  by  
mathematical equations, or empirical generalizations of the kind “all butterflies have wings”. An exception 
capable  of  breaking a  law would simply falsify the  known laws,  and would obviously not  go “against 
nature”. There is a clear sense in which physical processes cannot  trespass the limits of,  or  go against,  
physical laws, since laws, interpreted scientifically, yield the very concept of what is  physically possible. 
That is, a group of natural phenomena, or some event or process x, is to be regarded as physically possibly if 
and only if x is compatible with the laws of nature. If a physical law L turned out to be falsified by an event 
or a group of phenomena that are considered to be “going against” L, we would simply say that L is not as 
universal as we previously thought, and has exceptions. That is, we would say that it is not a law, in some  
definitions of law. This will also help to explain the ambiguous expression “going over the limits of nature”:  
in  an  innocent  sense,  this  expression  simply  means  that  we  have  discovered,  or  better  produced  or  
constructed new phenomena that do not seem to be covered by old laws. But in no sense can “going over the 
limit” imply “going against nature” in the descriptive sense of nature.
   In the other sense of “against nature”, nature is interpreted morally, and involves the realization of our 
moral essence. “Nature” here does not refer to the individual characters or natures of distinct human beings,  
but to a standard of moral perfection common to all  human beings. In other words, nature involves the  
question “how human beings ought to live”, not the question of how they practically and factually live. In  
this sense, civil laws, behaviours, and technological inventions can go against our nature, but only if “human 
nature” is interpreted morally. A different, but crucial question, is, of course: whence do we derive such 
shared ethical norms, if we cannot deduce them from empirical regularities, i.e., by looking at our biological  
nature? It seems to me that there are two major options at our disposals here, one based on creationism, or  
religious faith, the other on the so-called virtue-centered morality.
Certainly,  if  we view biological  evolution as  a  process  in which there  is  no pre-ordered design and  
everything unfolds aimlessly in a dialectic of chance and necessity, there seems to be even less room for 
deriving  norms  from  the  empirical  regularities  of  the  natural  world,  or  from  the  way  we  are  on  the  
descriptive level (see also Sidgwick 1907, p.80-1). The scenario looks different if we presuppose a sort of  
providential plan for nature and for human lives, so that a human life should be lived in a certain way  
because God wanted it to be so, since God created us to fulfil a certain aim.
However,  there  might  a  second  way  that  is  neutral  toward  creationism,  in  the  sense  that  does  not  
presuppose it,  and  is  therefore  compatible  also with neo-darwinism.  In  other  words,  there  might  be an 
Aristotelian notion of “human flourishing” or self-realization that is independent of any religious hypothesis,  
2  Think of all the examples of cooperation in the animal world, or to David Hume’s sympathy.
5a  virtue-centered  morality  that  presumably  bases  our  moral  behaviour  on  our  natural,  moral  impulses 
(sympathy, compassion, or impulses that make us “completely realized”). 
There are two main problems with this important tradition. The first is epistemological: provided we are  
also endowed with passions that lead us astray, how can we identify and distinguish the good impulses from  
the bad ones, previously and independently of a moral evaluation? (see Sidgwick 1907). We can always  
retort  that  only the good passions make us really  flourish,  and that  we have a natural  tendency toward 
flourishing,  unless  a  bad  education  distorts  our  “nature”.  Of  course,  cultivating  genuine  friendships,  or 
having a healthy parent-child relationship, or possessing literacy and education are all objective goods for  
human beings, or part of what we mean by “flourishing”, and not merely instrumental to it. The problems is 
not so much about the objectivity of such values (in which I believe, and which the theory of flourishing 
advocates), but whether we want to ground such objectivity in the way we are as biological beings, in our  
common biological nature. 
This difficulty, which I can only hint at in this context, is reflected in the twofold meaning of the word  
“flourishing” or “thriving”. These words describe our being absorbed in a complex process or in an activity  
(having or meeting friends) or our possessing of a capacity (like having literacy) as facts that we value:  
complex facts that also seem values, and this seem to go against the fact-value distinction. In reality, they  
don’t go against a certain way of putting the distinction. From the fact that the so-called well-educated or  
well-trained persons appreciate and enjoy in a special way certain activities, like spending time with friends,  
cannot be derived an ethical imperative per se. In cases of this kind, one can always raise the question “why 
should we value an enjoyment of that kind?” which appears a legitimate one, 3 especially if our nature is 
changeable and dependent also on cultural modifications.
3) “this is natural, non-adulterated, biological food,” often used against the introduction of OGM, is also a 
bad rhetorical trick. Agriculture, even biological, is not natural, is as artificial as it gets, it has been invented  
in the sense of being a complicated, contingent technique which has changed the history of human beings. Of  
course apple-trees produce apples “naturally”, but their cultivation often requires wearing and “artificial”  
interventions on our part (watering, pruning, or cross-fertilizing). This example is interesting for what will  
come next, since it is a clear instance of our tendency to mix the natural and the artificial: “natural” or bio-
food here can not be synonymous with non-artificial, since even “biological” agriculture is to a large extent  
artificial. Rather, it is synonymous with what we are most used to, what we are accustomed, what we have  
experimented so far.  On the other hand, feeding animals with antibiotics or hormones is likely to cause  
health problem, so the right  emphasis  should be not  on the opposition natural/artificial  or  according to  
nature/against  nature,  but  rather on beneficial/harmful  for our health,  or  not  harmful/harmful.  The same 
practical attitude should prevail on the issue surrounding the genetically modified organisms.
4) the fourth case involves our attitude toward food. The fact that mammals typically eat meat, and that  
we  are  mammals,  does  not  make  a  choice  for  vegetarianism  immoral.  And  yet  sometimes  we  hear 
discussions in which vegetarianism is condemned in the name of what is natural, of what factually most  
mammals do. Another instance of trying to derive norms from natural facts, that is also used in the name of  
discouraging or encouraging sexual promiscuity. Choosing pairs of mammals that show a faithful behaviour 
after copulation, or alternatively, indicating male mammals that are promiscuous as a paradigm for human 
males presupposes a previous commitment to ways of living that cannot be justified in the name of what  
happens in the biological world.
5) the fifth case, the expression “family as a natural society” in the Italian Constitution, has been recently 
the subject of hot controversies, in which I will not enter. Let it suffice to note that the reference of the 
adjective “natural” here is to one of the functions of our biological make-up, namely reproduction, with all  
its accompanying “activities”, namely, sexual attraction, caring for the children and their growth, etc., which  
are  regarded as  pre-legal,  pre-institutional,  pre-social  contract  facts  of  which the constitution takes  into 
account. 
The institution of marriage is then regarded as a legalization or the “institutionalisation” of our biological  
function of reproduction, regarded in this enlarged sense. We should also note that the fact that human beings 
can, or have the ability to, reproduce, does not create by itself a moral duty to reproduce: priests, nuns and  
other  admirable  human  beings  choose  and  have  chosen  not  to  do  so,  that  is,  not  to  have  a  family.  
3 Of course being able to read and write is instrumental to the enjoyment of many cultural and social activities, and is 
therefore also an instrumental value in this sense.
6Analogously, deciding whether the only kind of “family” should be formed by people of different sex − an  
ethical and legal principle − cannot be justified solely on the basis of facts pertaining to our biological make-
up and to our natural capacity for reproduction, but depends on some other values.
6) “living according to nature” is an important precept in stoic philosophy, with very important modern 
and even contemporary ramifications. The stoic precept is, once again, based on the idea that everything is  
as it should be, and our complaining about the presence of evil is simply due to our short-sighted incapacity 
of perceiving the whole chain of events constituting nature: our life is but a fragment of a cosmos permeated 
with a logos (reason) which ensures the rationality of all that is the case. As the quotation above shows, the 
utmost duty of the wise or the philosopher is to know the cosmic order of things, and control one’s passion in  
such a way that the unavoidable is accepted as an expression of our own will. The natural, physical order, as  
an expression of the rationality of the whole universe, also offers a moral guidance, so that the survival force  
of this position can hardly be downplayed...This position is also related to the idea that there is a human  
nature in the factual and moral sense and that the two are entangled.
§3 Why is the natural so naturally entangled with the ethical
In these six examples, “the entanglement of facts and values” (see Putnam 2004) seems quite evident, but 
devoid of much argumentative force.4 While a natural regularity, a description, a fact, something taking place 
in the biological world, cannot ground a juridical norm or an ethical rule, in the sense that we can derive it  
from the regularity, we have nevertheless a strong tendency to identify in nature a dispenser of norms.  Why 
is this the case? Are there explanations for this natural, possibly innate tendency of human beings to find a 
norm in the equilibrium/stability of the natural world to which we adapted during long centuries?
There are various reasons that can be considered to try to provide an answer to this complicated question.  
The first reason is that identifying norms in the natural, biological world, regarding nature as a dispenser of  
value, might itself be a form of natural or cultural adaptation! Human beings live in a natural environment to 
which they adapted during long intervals of time. Consequently, keeping an equilibrium between ourselves 
and the environment is functional to our survival, that is, tends to increase it. Put is simply, my hypothetical  
explanation, for which I cannot try to provide empirical arguments here, is as follows: since keeping an 
equilibrium with our natural environment involves, plausibly enough, a certain invariance or stability of the  
niche in which we have lived for millennia, we probably evolved a universal cultural attitude to consider any 
radical change in the relationship between ourselves and the environment as bad, or potentially dangerous. 
If any attitude that favours the stability of the environment is potentially adaptive, nothing can be more 
efficient to this aim than developing an approach toward the physical world around us that considers it as a  
dispenser  of  sacred  norms that  must  be respected.  The physical  order,  the  descriptive  regularity  of  the  
biological world and human morality are then inextricably entangled in order to preserve the equilibrium 
between ourselves and the external world, an equilibrium upon which our survival can obviously depend. I  
think that it is in this direction that we must search the reasons for the deep fear that new technological  
devices  have  always  generated.  The  fear  for  (nano-)  technologies  is  therefore  the  heritage  of  a  long  
evolutionary past, and we must keep it in mind if we want to avoid simple technocratic recipes. 
 The second reason that  explains the presence of a strong tendency to confuse the notion of natural  
regularity (laws of nature in the descriptive sense) with a moral law in the prescriptive sense derives from the 
persistent  residue  of  an  anthropomorphic  projection,  a  pre-scientific  tendency  to  explain  the  pervading 
existence of regularities in the physical world by an animistic attribution of “a soul” also to unanimated 
matter. In this way, the latter could be regarded as betraying the presence of an intellect or a more or less  
divine entity endowed with volitions, capable of imposing limits and norms of the same kind that human  
legislators impose in our societies. 
That natural regularities in the descriptive sense could only be explained as the fruit of an ordering will  
was already evident in Babylonian thought. As Robert Eisler indicates, the characteristics of the movement 
of the planets, which Babylonian astronomers studied with attention and skill, were interpreted 
4 Such an entanglement is also evident in our language, whenever we use morally thick concepts like cruel, generous, or criminal. 
According to Putnam, these concepts refer to a certain range of behaviours, so have a descriptive force, but at the same time qualify  
them morally, by evaluating them as bad or good.
7«[ . . . ] by the authors of tablets who created the library of Assurbanipal [ . . .] as dictated by the  
“laws”  or  decisions  governing  “heaven  and  earth,”  as  pronounced  by  the  creating  god  from the 
beginning.» (Eisler 1946, pp. 232 and 288).
The same author later adds that the concept of universal, scientific law derives “from this mythological 
concept [ . . . ] of decrees from heaven and from earth,” and in one of his other studies,  (Eisler, 1929, p. 618), 
highlights the importance of the social/political condition on the way nature is represented, given that the  
idea of the world as an entity ordered by events (what the Greeks called Kosmos) originated, in his opinion, 
in Babylonian social theory. This fact hints to a third, possible explanation of the tendency to confuse nature  
and norms, one that comes from an understandable inclination to project the social political world onto the 
natural world. 
With this theoretical background, I now pass to discuss the applied ethics case given by implantable 
micro-chips
§4 External vs. internal machines: is it still a meaningful distinction?
In the near future, our bodies might end up using not just use external prop-ups, like glasses or walking 
sticks, but also lots of internal ones, constructed artificially or naturally. Is this process of “hybridation” of  
our bodies with the artificial something to be afraid of? How should we proceed? 
I report here the words of Giuseppe O. Longo, professor of computer science in Trieste. First of all, he  
claims, “it is impossible for the biological part of the symbiotic hybrid to keep in step with the speed of the 
technological evolution, and this creates a deep discomfort. The second problem is the self perception of the 
person. Our body is the source of our personal identity… the unity of body and mind would be altered by  
fictional prosthesis that, for instance, could alter the capacity of our memory”.5
The first  point  is  obvious:  I already pointed out  the necessity for our well  being of considering our  
relationship with the environment as stable as possible;  the second fear,  however,  is  not  purely science  
fiction. Stefano Rodotà, an Italian jurist, refers to this hybridation as a “post-human state” (La Repubblica, 
6/12 2004): «On the 12th of October 2004 the Food and Drug Administration, has authorized the use of a 
very small chip that can be read at a distance, called VeriChip, to be installed under the skin of the patient  
and containing her whole clinical story.» The chip, as the www.verichip.com site advertises, “is able to offer 
rapid, secure patient identification, helping at-risk patients to get the right treatment when needed most.” The 
chip would help patients  affected by memory losses,  impaired speech or  simply patients  that  have lost  
consciousness. Further applications of “Verychip” envisage a protection against “baby switching”, which,  
according to web site, amount to thousand of cases per year in the U.S. only; the prevention of incidents  
related to old people wandering around and getting lost, or to have a maximum security of access to houses 
or banks or secret archives via a radio frequency identification. 
Rodotà concludes his article in a very poignant manner: «in this way the subject changes her personal and 
social status. A subject can always be on line, and become a networked person, configured in such a way that 
she can emit and receive impulses that allow others to track and reconstruct physical and mental conditions,  
habit, movements, contacts thereby modifying the sense and content of her autonomy» (Rodotà 2004).
I agree with Rodotà that cases like these deserve an attentive consideration, and a case-by-case analysis:  
our main guiding star,  as in other ethically sensitive cases, should be the principle of the dignity of the  
human being, and the idea that a human being should be treated not only as a means but always also an end 
in him/herself. For instance, as noted by Rodotà,  the importance of protecting personal data in cases like 
these should be obvious, especially if the data contained in the microchip are alterable by others. However, at 
the same time, we should be aware of an attitude that is still widespread in our cultures, and for the reasons  
we have tried to sketch in the previous sections: this attitude regards the whole of technological evolution as  
the dehumanising force of mankind. The following, brief considerations, will therefore try to convince the 
reader that we must learn to live with the extraordinary possibilities offered by nanotechnologies, without  
abandoning ourselves to easy or superficial enthusiasm. 
1) The technological development is following (and has in part fostered) that cultural tendency of going  
“inward bound” that has accompanied the last two century of physics, from the molecules to atoms, to quarks 
to string, if they exist…(see Pais 1988). The important message of the physics of the last two centuries is that  
the macroscopic properties of all the physical bodies supervene on the microscopic ones. From the statistical  
5  http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/rassegna/021119h.htm
8mechanics  of  gases  onward,  we have learnt  that  given two possible  worlds  with the  same microscopic  
structure, the worlds in question must be alike also from the macroscopic point of view (i.e., as philosophers  
say, they must supervene). Clearly, the major impact that nanotechnologies will have is going to depend on 
the asymmetric supervenience (dependence) of the properties of the big things on the very small ones.  
2) Despite their different speed, biological evolution and technological evolution obey the same abstract  
mechanism. Namely, a reproducing mechanism with some variations, and a selection process. Clearly, the 
reproduction of a machine or of an artefact is based on different supports and mechanism, since it depends on 
human brains, culture, and therefore on education and other processes that depend on learning, while the 
reproduction of an organism relies on chemical means (the DNA). This difference explains the difference in  
speed. But variations on the projects of technical artefacts explain their different impact on the market or on 
society,  and  this,  in  its  turn,  creates  a  selective  process  depending on  many aspects,  price,  dimension, 
pollution, etc. The advantage of a portable computer on a desktop having the same speed and memory is so 
obvious that the selective process goes in the direction of miniaturization and portability. This explains a 
strong selective push toward miniaturization.
3)  Applying  the  considerations  of  the  first  two  sections  to  the  question  of  the  possible  role  of 
nanotechnologies  in  our  societies,  what  can  we  conclude?  Once  we  accept  the  idea  that  artificially  
constructed hearts, or parts thereof, of dental prosthesis, of knees or hips can be already inserted in a human 
being, so that a person becomes a mixture of natural and artificial machines, where should we stop? I will  
simply present three examples involving the application of future technologies in the biomedical sciences, 
with potentially advantageous effects. 
First of all, think of the possibility that a microchip inserted in the brain of an epileptic patient might  
detect the onset of an epileptic seizure and switch it off by cooling down the involved neurons. Researchers  
at Washington University in St.  Louis, a couple of years ago, developed a microchip that can detect an  
oncoming seizure  and  prevent  it  from spreading  by  cooling  the  brain  cells.  The  study,  realized  at  the  
University of St Louis and published in the medical journal New Scientist, claims that it is possible to stop 
the seizure in the brain of rats by cooling brain cells from body temperature (about 37 degrees Celsius) to 
around 22 degrees Celsius.6 Apparently the cells did not suffer any damage.
Second point, the future of pharmacology can be revolutionized by the so-called individualized medicine: 
one could synthesize a particular gene, insert  it  in a certain organism for production,  and then obtain a 
molecule with a certain shape and function to be used to attack a determinate target (Boncinelli 2006, p. 66).  
Finally, there is the well-known case of regenerative medicine, with the possibility that stem cells or other  
similar totipotent cells might create new biological tissue. This is certainly a very promising and important  
field.
4) Of course, limiting oneself to examples taken from future applications to medicine may be too easy, as 
we are now talking about the possibility of implanting a nanocomputer in our brains that can either modify at  
will our mnemonic and algorithmic capacities, or augment the natural perceptive abilities. This would cause 
a collapse of our identity if and only if the chip will be used in a way that jeopardizes our dignity. However,  
there are no compelling reasons to depict a catastrophic picture here. 
I  can  imagine  that  people  having  memory  losses,  or  having  serious  prosopagnosic  disorders  (face-
blindedness), for example, could be helped by a chip that could correct the malfunctioning of some known 
parts of the brain.7 Don’t we write down in external artefacts (soft or hard agendas) the things we have to do 
in order to prevent forgetting our appointments? There is little question that there is a substantial difference  
between an external and an internal device, but I don’t see how the implant of an internal agenda that can be  
constantly updated as a terrible tragedy overturning our identity. However, it must be admitted that a chip 
that would put us in the condition of not forgetting a single experience of our life would not only jeopardize  
our identity but also destroy our social adaptation and well-functioning. 
But who want to have an implant of this kind? One needs only to be reminded of the tale of Jorge Borges  
about Funes el memorioso, the man who was incapable of forgetting. 
«We, in a glance, perceive three wine glasses on the table; Funes saw all the shoots, clusters, and grapes of 
the vine. He remembered the shapes of the clouds in the south at dawn on the 30th of April of 1882, and he 
could compare them in his recollection with the marbled grain in the design of a leather-bound book which 
he had seen only once, and with the lines in the spray which an oar raised in the Rio Negro on the eve of the 
battle of the Quebracho» 
6  The process of cooling shuts off the release of neurotransmitters, thereby making cells less susceptible to seizures.
7 Those of us suffering from the Capgas syndrome are convinced that the persons that are around them that they know and care for  
are constantly being replaced by copies of the real persons.
9It is obvious that our minds require an economic system of encapsulating information, to prevent them 
from being cluttered with  irrelevant  minutiae.  There is  also the practical  impossibility of living without 
forgetting because remembering is, automatically, selecting certain aspects of our experience at the expense 
of others, i.e., we cannot remember if we do not at the same time, forget. The Russian psychologist Luria  
(1969) has told about his medical experience with a patient that could never complete any task because he 
was constantly reminded of thousand of things that were connected with his present experience. 
The Italian philosopher Paolo Rossi correctly reminds us about the importance of forgetting in the very  
process of life: 
«Quindi, se non c'è dimenticanza, non c'è neppure memoria, c'è soltanto questa specie di cosa spaventosa  
che sarebbe il ricordare tutto. Tant'è vero che, quando lo lessi mi colpì molto, citai nel mio libro un racconto 
dei chassidim un racconto, diciamo mitico, che dice che gli uomini debbono imparare a dimenticare e a 
ricordare e che se non fossero in grado di dimenticare non potrebbero neppure vivere, perché non avrebbero  
la forza di fare cose, penserebbero soltanto alla loro morte. Per questo — dice il racconto − quando un  
bambino nasce c'è un angelo che gli insegna le cose e uno che gli batte sulla bocca perchè dimentichi le cose 
che ha imparato. E' una cosa, un racconto che mi è sembrato splendido, mi sembra ancora splendido, perché  
in  questa  forma  di  analogia  dice  il  nocciolo  di  quello  che  volevo  dire.»  (Paolo  Rossi,  in 
http://www.emsf.rai.it/tv_tematica/trasmissioni.asp?d=392). 
We would not be able to live because we would constantly think about our future death, while during our 
daily life we forget that we are mortal.
One could imagine to be able to transfer the whole ocean of data that is available in the web in the  
head of each of us. Would that be useful? We should not forget that one can have already now as many 
data (externally available) through the web as one may want, but the real question is organizing it and 
understanding in more economical schemes, i.e., frame it in order to construe a valuable hypothesis. This  
is what, for instance, discovering a law of nature is: summarizing a lot of possible observations in a single  
formula. [ . . . ] «science is a form of business. It aims, with a minimum of effort, in a minimum amount 
of time, and with a minimum exertion of thought, to appropriate the maximum amount of infinity and 
external truth for itself» (Mach 1896 p. 14). And in this sense, transferring the whole head in an updatable 
chip would not  serve any purpose.  And I  trust  that  people  would not  even try to  have such a  chip  
implanted.
One last, important aspect is the emotional one. So far I have explored the cognitive rather than the 
emotional part of the possible changes introduced by implantable chips in our heads, but what about a chip 
altering  our  internal  emotional  states,  and,  similar  to  the  experience  machine  invented  by  the  Harvard 
philosopher Robert Nozick in  Anarchy, State and Utopia  (Nozick 1974, pp. 42-45). In this book Nozick 
imagines a machine capable of simulating all the pleasurable experiences we might want to dream of, with 
the corresponding pleasure. Suppose now that a chip could be realized in such a way that we would not be 
able  to tell  that  those experience are  not real.  So we could experience to  have a  dinner  with the most 
beautiful man or woman, to win the final game of Roland Garros, to cross the Pacific with a sailboat, or  
receive a Nobel prize for peace. But all of this would not be a real experience, simply a virtual one. How  
many of us would decide to have chips inserted under their skin that simulate virtual and dreamt-of realities  
without  the  possibility  of  coming back to  the  real  world? That  is,  would  we  choose  to  have  the  chip 
implanted over real life?
Nozick gives the following three reasons not to attach ourselves to the machine, which can be extended to  
microchips altering our emotional states. 
1) We don’t want the strawberry because we like the experience of eating one, we like the experience 
because we want to eat the strawberry. “It is only because we first want to do the actions that we want 
the experiences of doing them.” (Nozick, 1981, p. 43). Here the opposition is between the real action 
and what it feels doing it. But we could imagine that the chip gives us the impression of acting as well.  
Nozick’s point here does not look decisive.
2)  We want to be a certain sort of person: "Someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob." (ibid, p. 
43). This is more central point, and relates to our need of living a life of effort and plan. But the reply  
could always be that by having the chip inserted one would have the impression of living such a life. 
3) "There is no  actual contact with any deeper reality, though the experience of it can be simulated." 
(ibid, p. 43). This seems the crucial problem. Knowing in advance that what we will experience after 
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having a microchip implanted has not been gained with honest toil and is not real, would deprive the  
pleasurable experience from any meaning. 
Not only does this show that hedonism is not a correct theory of our behaviour − i.e, that pleasure does  
not completely motivate our actions, let alone something that ought to motivate it − but also that we should  
not worry too much about chips that in the foreseable future could alter our emotional states. 
No reason to worry, I would conclude, about implant altering our cognitive/affective states, even though 
the effort to adjust to the speed of technology cannot be downplayed and is the main and foremost reason of 
fear, a fear that could even have been implanted in our brain by biological evolution.8 
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